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To David Rawson

From Alison Des Forges
Following is a memo that I sent to Greg Craig before Secretary Albright's trip to Rwanda i.u
December 1997. I said essentially the same thi.ugs i.u a memo to High Commissioner Robinson, so
I see no need to send that as well.

I have deleted a section i.ucludi.ug ilames of a variety of people whom I recommended as possible
interlocutors fo~:.the Secretary and fo1: U.S. diplomats in general. Ifby any chance our Washington
office sends you the complete memo (these things ·happen), please destroy the section with the
name$-I found to my great d~ess that my original memo ended up in the hands at least cif
Gahima (and perhaps others) and I fear that some of the persons suggested by me may have
· suffered from that mention.
Hope you enjQy meeting With Catherine. I find her a lively and well-illformed observer--at least on
. the ea$1:em side of the continent and I suppose she will be the same for your current beat.
Best,

~

I:Jl

U.S. POLICY IN RWANDA

Rwandans, as Genernl Kagame makes clear with refreshing candor and feistiness, can and
will detennine the course of their own affairs. But Kagame and his circle very much want
international recognition as "new leaders'' and they need international aid to deal with an
overwhelming. number of problems. Hence they can be swayed by international actors, particulaTly
by the U.S., clearly the most influential foreign actor on t..he scene.
Tbe Present Situation
Despite the dynamic and confident opt:imjsm projected by Kagame, the present situation is
not hopeful: the leadership is moving towaTd exclusion, not inclusion in the political process; the
insurgency continues and is growing in poltical strength; the excessive use of force by the military
goes unchecked; the process ofjustice moves with a slowness that cannot be explained solely by
material difficulties; assassinations, disappearances, md numerous le.,ser abuses go uninwstigated
and uopunished; respected civilian and military leaders have fled the country; and corruption
flourishes among officials. As a result, the government and even the JU>F itself are losing
legitimacy, including among former Tutsi supporters.
When the new government was established in July 1994, it seemed to be a real coalition,
multi-ethnic, multiparty, including both civilian and military leaders, and representing various
points of view. Just over a yeaT later, men representing the hard line, more dependent on force
and less on law, took the ascendant and began excluding from government or marginalizing within
the government both Hutu of real stature and moderate Tutsi, incluiling at ministerial level:
Twagiramuogu, Sendashonga, :N'kubito, Nkuliyingoma, Mucegande, Kanyarengwe, Rugenera,
Birara. At the same time, government soldiers (Rwandan Patriotic Army, RPA) carried out or
permitted assasstnations or disappearances of administrators at the level of prefect (governor),
sub-prefect, and burgomaster and ofjudges and other judicial personnel. More recently, RPA
soldiers have killed Captain Hategekimana and aTreSted Major Ngirnbatware, important officers,
re-integn!ted into the RPA from the former government aTmy. In the last few days, govemment
spokesmen, including President Bizimungu, have suggested that the elections fu.reseen in two
years may not take place and that even the current structure of the national assembly is no longer
appropriate.
Despite optimistic predictions by the government, the insurgency continues. The discovery
of one insurgent base in the eaves of the northwest was an important victory, but the entire
northwest is honeycombed with caves and the forests of the region make ideal hiding places as
well. Even more important than such logistical considerations are the political ones; the
government does not have most of the people with it.
Sporadic efforts at winning popullll' ba<;J!Qng are often 1.1ndone by the excessive use offorre
•he RPA When charged by foreigners with military attacks against civilians, General Kagame
·ther RPA officers have a set of standard excuses that they have used since 1994: that RPA
overwhelmed by grief and rage at the genocide, lost control ofthemselves; that they
distinguish insurgentS: from noncombattants; that they fired in self-defense; that they
'l.S unintentionally in an exchange of fire with insurgents; or that the insurgents
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themselves, not the RPA, killed the civilians. While foreigners often are--or at least appear to beconvinced by such excuses, those shot at know that the truth lies elsewhere: that soldiers regard
them also as the enemy and care little, if at all, about protecting their lives.
The slow progress of the genocide trials, the result of political indecision as much as of
.mmmal problems, has cost the government much legitimacy among Tutsi survivors of the
·genocide as well as among HutU who ru:e accused of the crime. Of the nearly 130,000 now
imprisoned on charges of genocide, thousands have been falsely accused, either through error or
as a way to acquire their property or to settle past disputes.
The failure to try the accused more promptly and the inhumane ronditions of detention
· contribute to perceptions among Hutu that reprisals, not justice, is the ol:!jective of the judicial
system. The Ionge~: prisoners are detained in such conditions, the more embittered they become
and the more time they have to work out an organization among themselves. When released,
whether by official action, by insurgent attack on the prisons, or by breaking out, they will offer
an. ideal pool from which to recruit !lllll?d opponents to the government, Insurgents will continue
to tru:get communal jai1s, ·and eventually central prisons. We have jus! received information that
prisoners in at least one of the central prisons, encouraged by the insurgents' attacks on the
communal jails, are putting aside the astonishing docility that bas go\ ·erned their behavior thus fur
and are beginning to talk about escape plans. With the prospect ofbeing freed or freeing
themselves by force, many who might otherwise have considered accepting plea bargains will no
longer do so.
In scores of cases, RPA or civilians linked with them, have tak:en the lives or pmperty of
other Rwandans without suffering the least consequence. Soldiers and their associates from the
start appropriated property of all kinds from those thought to be participants in the genocide or
enemies of the government, a: pattern they repeated during militru:y operations in the Congo. Wrth
. the growing flow of foreign as:sistance money to the government, some officials have enriched
themselves with those funds: Jean Birara, a highly respected technocrat, was recently removed
from his post as Minister of Plan and Finance in part because of a personal co:flict with President
Bizimungu. in part beeause· be refused to condone this kind of corruption. The Kigali press,
including journals close to the government, have publicly criticized these practices.
The blatant gap between rich military and civilian officials and the mass of the population
·
undermines the legitimacy of the government, including among survivors of the genocide. It is
particularly tragic to see Tutsi widows struggling to keep their children alive in conditions of
desperate poverty while government servants go from one luxmy to che next.
Disillusionment with the RPF is so grave that its backers in the diaspora, those who
funded its 1990-1994 campaign, wrote a bitter protest in August, 1997 against the "intellectual ·
bankruptcy," "moral declille," "unexplained accumulation of wealth,'. and "lack of accountability
and arrogance" of the RPF leadership.

The Iilsurg~ts
With the elimination of the camps in Zaire and the shadow government housed in them,
opponents ofthe current government in the diaspora have worked more vigorously to overcome
their differences-:-many of them the result of difierent positions on the genocide-and to build a
political structure for the insurgency. If such a structure encompasse.~ men of standing,
particularly those who had no apparent involvement in the genocide, it may win support ~ong
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considerable numbers ofRwandans at home and abroad.
In the first year or two of control, the government progressively eliminated judicial and
administrative officials who were supposed not completely committed to the new regime,
sometimes by murdering them, arresting them or causing them to disappear. In more recent
months, the insurgents have been murdering those officials whom they see as supporters of the
government. Attacked by both sides, moderates are excluded or exclude themselves from
government senzice.
The insurgents are also increasingly resorting to attacks on civilians to enlist their support
and to force them to ~ against the government. In the end, the ordinary people, terrorized by
both sides, will have nowhere to go. In such a situation of generalized fear, they will be all the
more Vulnerable to bate propaganda and to calls for ethnic violence. Should these conditions
continue, insur;gent leaders will find growing numbers of ordinary people ready to resume the
genocide.
A New U.S. Policy

A new U.S. policy on in.p:Dan rights and justice is necessary to help restrain the ex:tre:inists
and give renewed hope ai!d courage to moderates in Rwanda.
·
Despite frequent profession of support for human rights and jllstice, the U.S. fails to act
according to· its ideals in one case after another: inaction in the face of a genocide; acquiescence in
the former military's misuse of resources and protection meant for genuine refugees in the Congo
camps; toleration of grave daily abuses-even of massacres--by the current Rwandan government
both in Rwanda and in the Congo; silence before travesties ofjustice in both the civilian and
lililitary judicial systems; Jack of support for efforts by international and local human rights and
· hJ.imaxmarian workers to publicize human rights abuses.
DepOOdmg on the political view of the Rwandan observers, they will condemn some of
these failings while ignoring thil others, but all must conclude-whatever their ethnic group or
political convictions-that in the domains of human rights and justice, the U.S. rarely means what
it says.·
To attempt to halt the slide into greater extre:inism and violence in Rwanda, the U.S. must
insist that a primary policy o~ective is avoiding further massive k:illin gs of civilians and the
consequent refugee flows in the region. It must consequently disapprove of any excessive and
abusive military operations that would result in lruge numbers of civi Iian casualities, even when
provoked by insurgent attacks. The U.S. must insist that the distinction between combattants and
noncol)lbattants, as established in international law, be observed and that officers and soldiers who
violate the laws of war be prosecuted in trails with serious prosecutions and appropriate
punishments. Such a stand can help set the parameters for a struggle which promises to become
increasingly ruthless and bloody. By finnly establishing such limits, the U.S. may hope to put
obstacles in the way of hard-liners and to give moderates some leverage in working against them
within the system.
The U.S. must also insist t!lat the Rwandan government pursue political strategies to win
increased acceptability among its citizens, including by protecting the lives and property of all
equally. The U.S. must make clearthat its conviction that military repression is neither a
legitimate nor an effective basis for a stable government.
Only by adopting a :firmer· stand on human rights and justice can the U.S. expect any

from
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·substantial return on its financial investments in these areas. Money spent to make technical
improvements in the justice system or to teach ~ncep~ ofhum:m ~ghts and justice, whether ~o
military officers, to judicial personnel, or to ordmary crt_JZ~· will yteld few ~ong-terrn resu1~s
the U.s. government discredits its own lessons by keepmg silent on human tights a?uses. ~imilarly
· funds invested in strengthening civil society will produce little unless the U.S. also mvests tts
political capital to insist that nol;-governmental organizations be assv red the space necessary to
develop their positions, even if they criticize the government.

!f

Implementing A New U.S. Policy

The U.S. should exploit the visit of the Secretary of State to make clear the new policy.
Implementation involves three steps: public statement or statements, questions to Kagame and
other Rwandan authorities, and contacts with Rwandans who are not part of the current power
elite.
Kagante and other Rwandan leaders have always professed their commitment to justice
and human rights. Occasionally they have acted on these professions, as in ensuring the safe return
of the majority of :refugees from abroad; in beginning trials for the genocide, albeit slowly and not
always with necessary guarantees of due process; in improving prison conditions for children and,
most recently, for former soldiers (ex-FAR) detained at Mu1indi camp; in releasing children,
elde.rly and infirm detainees; in tolerating the continued presence of foreign human rights
monitors, boih from the UN and from international human rights groups; in releasing detained
human rights activists; and in improving its cooperation with the International Tnounal.
The government may have taken some positive actions as a resu1t of pressures from within
they were apparently responding to U.S. interventions. Rwandan
the country, but, in
leaders do care what U.S. leaders say about their performance. Immediately after the July hearings
in·the House where Representatives and witnesses strongly criticized the Rwandan govemment,
the head of one of the intelligence. services tried discreetly to arrange for a visit to Rwanda by
former Senator Kassebaum, hoping that she could be persuaded to quiet criticism among
Republicans in Congress. The effort demonstrated a misreading of the realities of Arnericcm
politics and fulled, but it proves nonetheless that Rwandans listen when powerful Americans speak
on human rights issiles.
The Rwandan declarations about human rights and justice as well as the positive steps
indicating some sensitivity on these issues give an opening for the U.S. to push for more progress
in transforming rhetoric into .reality.

others,

The Questions
Discussions of human rights with Rwandan authorities have too often been limited to
abstract principles without the reinforcement of concrete discussion of difficult cases. In addition,
when cases are raised, they are apparently dropped after a brief period of concern. Thus
· Rwandans have fuund it effective to give much lip service to the ideats, to profess co:O:cem over
cases raised and. then to simply wait for foreign governments to forget the issue.
The Secretary ofState wou1d indicate a new finnness in policy by going beyond the
rhetoric to ask detailed questions, indicating that she and her staff valued these issues enough to
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become informed on the specifics.
Of course, the embassy and State department staff could supply such any number of such
questions. The intention to follow through on such matters could best be shown by treating cases
from some time in the past as well as those more current.
One area of inquiry should certainly be military abuses and military justice, including
questions about:
I) the killings of civilians in recent military operations
2) the status of investigations about certain egregious cases of massacres in the
past, up to and includ_ing that at Mahoko market in August
3) reasons for the obviously weak prosecution and inappropriately light
_punishment of officers brought to trial for the massacres at Kibeho in Aprill995 (minimum 2,000
dead) and at Kanama in September 1995; reasons why there have been no further investigations
or trials in these cases after those first accused were acquitted of all serious clwges.
. 4) questions about reports that officers who were supposedly detained, including,
for example, Col. Ibinglra, charged in the Kibeho massacre, were not actually imprisoned;
questions about where officers condemned to jail terms for massacres in Ruhengeri in March will
·serve their terms and if they can be visited by human rights investigators
5) status of investigations and projected trial date fur the hundreds offormer
-government soldiers (ex-FAR) now imprisoned on accusation of genocide
6) numbers of civilians now detained in military facilities, numbers of civilians tried
by military courts, and results of such trials
Questions on other human rights issues could include tbe status of investigations into:
1) the attack that killed three Spanish and severely wounded one American staff of
Doctors ofthe Wodd (the American had to have his leg amputated)
2) the murder of five staff members of the UN Human Rights Field Operation
3) the assassinations of important government officials, for example, Prefect of
Butare, Pierre-Claver Rwangabo, sub-prefect Placide Kolonyi, and the Vice-President of the
Supreme Court
4) the disappearance of former judge and human rights activist Innocent
Murengezi
5) the interrogation and/or detention of human rights activists Emmanuel
Hitimana, Andre Sibomana, and Rosalie Mukarukaka and the search of the offices of the
Association fur the Defense ofHuman Rights and Public Liberties
·
An additional important question on political rights would be the significance of recent
declarations ofPresident Bizimungu and others indicating reservations about a commitment to
elections and to continuing the present structure of the national allserr!bly.
Contacts
As a matter of principle, the U.S. advocates dealing respectfuUy with members of the

political opposition, persons of all ethnic groups, and members of civil society. But, in practice,
important U_S __ representatives too frequently limit their contacts to Tutsi and RPF members of
government. The Secretary of State would convey a new direction iD American policy simply by
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insisting on seeing persons outside the narrow group that usually pre-empts fureign visitors. In
addition, she and her staff would bave the opportunity to acquire new and broader perspectives on
the current situation.
A decision to adopt a :firmer, more consistent policy on human rights and justice would be
well launched by this plan of public declaration, astute guestioning on concrete cases, and
contacts with 1 Rwandans outside the governing elite.

For the policy to have real impact, it would require persistent follow-through by embassy
staff as well as coordinated, long-tenn action with other donor nations.

